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Ryan Steidl* 
Application of Functional Claiming Limitations: 
The Practical Effects on Software–Related Patents 
“That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral 
and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been 
peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, 
expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the air 
in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or 
exclusive approbation.”1 
 
Software-related patents2 have become the subject of considerable scrutiny as 
the rate and volume of patents involved in litigation continues to increase rapidly, 
especially among patents with claim language that defines elements by their 
function rather than their structure.3 In an analysis of 500 representative lawsuits 
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 1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) (on file with Founders Online, 
National Archives), available at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0322. 
 2. The term “software patent” is used most often in a loose and colloquial manner. Whenever claims 
involve a computer, processing device, or electronic technology, typically this generic term is used to describe 
the patent. However, nonspecific descriptors create many complications—for instance, in practice, lack of 
uniform terminology has made it difficult, if not impossible, to perform adequate software-related patent 
searches. See, e.g., Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
289, 297–305 (2012), available at http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/913.  
 3. See Government Accountability Office, Intellectual Property: Assessing Factors That Affect Patent 
Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve Patent Quality, Aug. 22, 2013, available at http://www.gao.gov/prod 
ucts/GAO-13-465. See also Dennis Crouch, Functional Claim Language in Issued Patents, PATENTLY-O BLOG 
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from 2007 to 2011, the Government Accountability Office found a 129 percent 
increase in the number of defendants involved in patent infringement litigation, 
with software-related patent issues accounting for 89 percent of the increase.4 
Despite the many reasons for such proliferation,5 software-related patents present 
challenges that are distinct from other fields of industry, including “problems 
stemming from its mathematical properties, the structure of the software market, 
and the importance of interoperability.”6 Although many ideas have been proposed 
for resolving the challenges of how to manage software-related patents,7 this 
Comment focuses on the particular approach that has been advocated by Professor 
Mark Lemley.8 
Lemley has been an advocate for stricter application of functional claiming 
limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f)9 and restricting patent claims that define 
elements by what they “do” rather than what they “are.”10 While the effectiveness of 
Lemley’s proposal is uncertain until it can be tested before judges who understand 
the details,11 it is still possible to gain a sense of what the practical effects may be 
from adopting his approach. Accordingly, this Comment applies stricter functional 
claiming limitations to a survey of previously litigated patents, analyzes the claims, 
and explains what outcomes might occur. 
In order to provide full context, this Comment also examines some of the related 
issues associated with software-related patents. Part I discusses background topics 
including problematic issues with software-related patents, policies, and proposed 
resolutions for such problems—this part discusses some of the major difficulties 
with the current state of software patents,12 suggested solutions others have set 
forth,13 and some of the inadequate guidance that has been provided by the courts 
 
(Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/01/functional-language-patents.html; ROBERT C. 
FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING 3-111 (6th ed. 2008). 
 4. Intellectual Property: Assessing Factors That Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve 
Patent Quality, supra note 3, at 14. 
 5. Id. at 28–35. 
 6. BEN KLEMENS, MATH YOU CAN’T USE: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, AND SOFTWARE 4 (Brookings Inst. Press 
2006). Klemens’ book is a phenomenal resource on software-related patents—it provides an excellent in-depth 
examination of the many issues and conflicts between software/mathematics, law, and economics. 
 7. See infra Part I.B. 
 8. Professor Mark Lemley is the William H. Neukom Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, the 
Director of the Stanford Program in Law, Science and Technology, Director of Stanford’s LLM Program in Law, 
Science and Technology, and a founding partner of Durie Tangri LLP. 
 9. Herein referred to alternatively as “Section 112(f)” or simply “112(f).” 
 10. See infra Part II.B; see also FABER, supra note 3. 
 11. Mike Masnick, Fixing Software Patents by Actually Applying Exiting Patent Law, TECHDIRT.COM (Sept. 
20, 2012), www.techdirt.com/articles/20120915/23461020394/fixing-software-patents-actually-applying-existin 
g-patent-law.shtml. See also Clyde Findley, Hope for Software Patents, CLOUDIGYLAW.COM, (Nov. 13, 2013), http: 
//cloudigylaw.com/hope-software-patents/. 
 12. See infra Part I.A. 
 13. See infra Part I.B. 
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so far.14 Part II provides an overview of Lemley’s work, including historical use of 
functional claiming, current treatment of software-related patents, and potential 
benefits of Lemley’s proposed solution.15 Part III examines and explains how patents 
would be analyzed under stricter 112(f) functional claiming limitations,16 and 
whether the claims would be able to meet those standards.17 Finally, the conclusion 
reached here is that although many software-related patents would not survive strict 
application of 112(f), such an approach would not be too burdensome or 
overbroad, and instead would hold software-related patents to a much-needed 
higher standard.18 
I. Problems, Policy, and Proposed Solutions 
A. Problematic Issues with Software-Related Patents 
Many practitioners—in law, business, technology, and other fields—have been 
critical of software-related patents due to a variety of problematic issues. Some of 
the most basic issues involve the patent system’s incompatibility with the scale of 
software-related industries, the stockpiling of patents by both practicing and non-
practicing entities, as well as the unique qualities of software-related patents that 
distinguish them from other intellectual property. 
The sheer size and complexity of software-based industries presents daunting 
challenges for navigating the current patent system.19 For perspective, looking at an 
estimated 600,000 firms creating software, and 40,000 software patents issued each 
year (and growing), the resulting number of patent-firm pairs that could potentially 
infringe comes in at around 24 billion.20 Consequently, there is no cost-effective or 
time-effective way for businesses or firms to discover and ensure noninfringement 
of all existing patents.21 Not surprisingly, it is common practice to simply ignore 
patents altogether22 and justify such actions with excuses of: length of time it takes 
to settle negotiations, unwillingness of patent holders to offer reasonable terms, 
invalidity of many patents, and the prohibitively high numbers of licenses that may 
need to be obtained.23 
The term “patent thicket” aptly describes the many problems associated with 
scale—it is defined as “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a 
 
 14. See infra Part I.C. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part III.A. 
 17. See infra Part III.B. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See Mulligan & Lee, supra note 2, at 293. 
 20. Id. at 304. 
 21. Id. at 307. 
 22. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21 (2008). 
 23. Id. at 25–29. 
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company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new 
technology. With the cumulative effects of innovation and multiple blocking 
patents, stronger patent rights can have the perverse effect of stifling, not 
encouraging, innovation.”24 Although there can be different types of patent thickets, 
many thickets stifle innovation due to the adverse interrelationship and assertions 
of existing patent rights.25 
Using patent thickets for leverage has led to multi-billion dollar arms races and 
various forms of gamesmanship26 given that exclusive rights and uncontested power 
without competition in the marketplace27 provides strong incentives for pursuing a 
domineering type of strategy. For larger entities, it is not in their interests to 
completely exclude others from a market.28 Many large businesses flex their 
expansive portfolios and positions to “negotiate” licensing deals with smaller 
entities29—particularly innovative businesses that have recently become successful.30 
Many businesses must simply assume that all software will somehow infringe on an 
existing patent, and so concerns must necessarily shift from absolute avoidance to 
minimizing the probability that a patent holder will pursue action, or minimizing 
the licensing fees that will be paid.31 Yet whether used as bargaining chips, or for 
 
 24. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 120 (2000). 
 25. See, e.g., James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies (Bos. Univ. School 
of Law, Working Paper, 2003), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=327760. 
 26. Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 931–32 
(2013). See also KLEMENS, supra note 6, at 80–90. 
 27. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patents Are Property: A Fundamental But Important Concept, 4 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 87, 88, 90 (2009), available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol4/iss1/4. 
 28. KLEMENS, supra note 6, at 83–87. 
 29. The types of threats posed by patent thickets is evident in an anecdote from Gary L. Reback when he 
represented Sun Microsystems in the 1980s. IBM had accused Sun of infringing on seven patents, threatening 
the then-small company with a massive lawsuit, and demanding a meeting to discuss the claims. According to 
Reback, even though the IBM legal team accepted Sun’s conclusions that no court would likely find 
infringement, they replied coldly: “Maybe you don’t infringe on these patents. But we have 10,000 U.S. patents. 
Do you want us to go back to our headquarters and find seven you do infringe on, or do you want to make this 
easy and just pay us $20 million?” After some negotiations, Sun eventually cut IBM a check. See Gary L. Reback, 
Patently Absurd, FORBES, (June 24, 2002), available at http://www.forbes.com/asap/2002/0624/044.html. 
 30. Twitter’s update to its S-1 in November 2013 provides an example of the ongoing practice of leveraging 
patent portfolios against businesses that have gained attention from recent successes. Twitter disclosed that IBM 
had sent a letter alleging infringement of at least three U.S. patents and offered an invitation to “negotiate a 
business resolution of the allegations.” Like Sun Microsystems, it appears Twitter is prepared to defend itself 
against these kinds of claims as it becomes a bigger target. Of note, Twitter’s disclosure raises concerns that are 
likely shared by other growing businesses: “From time to time we may introduce new products and services, 
including in areas where we currently do not have an offering, which could increase our exposure to patent and 
other intellectual property claims from competitors and non-practicing entities.” See Ingrid Lunden, IBM 
Claims Twitter Infringes On At Least 3 Of Its Patents, According To Twitter’s Latest S-1 Update, 
TECHCRUNCH.COM (Nov. 4, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/11/04/ibm-claims-twitter-infringes-on-at-least 
-3-of-its-patents-according-to-twitters-latest-s-1-update/. 
 31. It has been calculated that it is mathematically impossible to avoid infringement: “[I]t would take at 
least 2,000,000 patent attorneys, working full time, to consider whether all these software-producing firms have 
infringed any of the software patents issued in a typical year. Even if firms wanted to hire that many attorneys, 
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licensing purposes, the core function of software-related patents has seemingly 
become less about innovation and more about “business strategy, gaming, 
squeezing players out, and preventing people from wanting to take risks.”32 
Patent leveraging is also done by entities that own patents but do not directly use 
them to produce goods or services, instead asserting the patents against companies 
that do produce such goods and services.33 These non-practicing entities (“NPEs”) 
are known by the more pejorative term “patent troll,” despite the distinction 
between the two.34 The costs of NPE patent assertions are substantial, estimated at 
potentially $29 billion per year in direct costs,35 with annual wealth losses from NPE 
lawsuits estimated at about $80 billion.36 Congress has taken some interest in patent 
litigation and fixing gaps in the 2011 America Invents Act—such as the failure to 
rein in abuses by NPEs—but any changes will most likely be slow to occur.37 
In addition to the various issues with scale and stockpiling of software-related 
patents, such patents also possess unique qualities that courts have often 
inadequately distinguished from other patentable subject matter.38 The most 
overlooked consideration is arguably that “a sufficiently detailed description of a 
computer program is the program itself, so it is sometimes difficult to distinguish 
between the idea and its implementation.”39 Secondly, the courts have done little to 
resolve the contradiction that mathematics is unpatentable subject matter,40 yet “in 
a literal sense, at its most basic level software is nothing more than a piece of 
mathematics.”41 Finally, courts have been slow to recognize that “software patents 
are a restriction not only on competitors but on a wide array of computer users.”42 
 
they couldn’t; there are only 40,000 registered patent attorneys and agents in the United States.” See Timothy B. 
Lee & Christina Mulligan, Opinion: The Problem With Software Patents? They Don’t Scale, ARSTECHNICA (Mar. 
8, 2012), available at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/03/opinion-the-problem-with-software-patents-
they-dont-scale/; see also Mulligan & Lee, supra note 2, at 304–305; c.f. KLEMENS, supra note 6, at 85 (Licensing 
fees are major sources of revenues for larger entities. For instance, from 1993 to 2002 IBM had 22,357 patents 
granted to it and received $10 billion in licensing fees.).  
 32. Hearing on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, 138, (Mar. 20, 2002) (testimony of Edward. J. Black), available at: www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/02 
0320trans.pdf. 
 33. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes 3 (Bos. Univ. School of Law, 
Working Paper No. 12-34, 2012), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2012.h 
tml. 
 34. Not all NPEs are patent trolls. For instance, a university may be an NPE but no one would consider a 
university to be a “patent troll” in the traditional sense. See David A. Boag, Rep. Bob Goodlatte’s 43-Day Assault 
on the Patent Troll, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Dec. 15, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/12/13/rep-goodlattes-43-
day-assault-on-the-patent-troll/. 
 35. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 33, at 19. 
 36. Id. at 5. 
 37. Boag, supra note 34. 
 38. KLEMENS, supra note 6, at 4–5. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (2014). 
 41. KLEMENS, supra note 6, at 4–5. 
 42. Id. 
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Although these three points are not an exhaustive list of software’s unique qualities, 
they are important considerations that should be accounted for in any proposed or 
adopted reforms to current laws. 
B. Proposed Solutions to Software-Related Patents 
There have been many suggestions put forth for how to “solve” the various 
problems associated with software-related patents. In 2012, a conference entitled 
“Solutions to the Software Patent Problem” brought together some of the leading 
ideas and different approaches that might be considered for more widespread 
adoption.43 Proposals have ranged from outright abolishment of the software patent 
category altogether, to greater enforcement of existing legislation, to expanded use 
of independent inventorship considerations. 
The most sweeping proposal by far has sought an end to all software patents.44 
Groups have petitioned the White House to “pursue software patent abolition,”45 
while those involved in areas of academia46 and entrepreneurship47 alike have also 
voiced support for eliminating software-related patents.48 After New Zealand 
approved a general ban on software patents,49 some have called for the United States 
to follow suit.50 Yet outright abolishment has been criticized as an overbroad 
approach and is unlikely to actually occur.51 
A more basic proposal has suggested heightening the standards of review at the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in order to weed out bad patents.52 In a 
comparison to the bioinformatics field, it has been asserted that more stringent 
 
 43. See Solutions to the Software Patent Problem, Santa Clara Univ., http://law.scu.edu/hightech/2012-
solutions-to-the-software-patent-problem/. 
 44. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 26, at 936–37 n.132.  
 45. See Dennis Crouch, We the People: Petitioning President Obama to End Software Patents, PATENTLY-O 
BLOG (Nov. 2, 2011), http:// www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/11/we-the-people-petitioning-president-obama-
to-end-software-patents.html. 
 46. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and 
Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990). 
 47. See generally Vivek Wadha, Why We Need to Abolish Software Patents, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Aug., 7, 
2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/08/07/why-we-need-to-abolish-software-patents/. 
 48. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 352–53 (2012) (noting 
proposals to abolish software patents as a potential reform approach for reducing patent numbers). 
 49. Lucy Craymer, New Zealand Ends Patents for Basic Software, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2013, available at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/09/01/new-zealand-ends-patents-for-basic-software/. 
 50. See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, New Zealand Just Abolished Software Patents. Here’s Why We Should, Too., 
WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/29/new-
zealand-just-abolished-software-patents-heres-why-we-should-too/. See also Ben Taylor, It’s Time to Outlaw 
Software Patents, AMERICANTHINKER.COM (Sept. 7, 2013), available at http://www.americanthinker.com/2013/0 
9/its_time_to_outlaw_software_patents.html. 
 51. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 26, at 937. 
 52. Id. at 938–39. See also Arti Rai, Let’s Tame Software Patent Claims: Lessons From Bioinformatics, 
WIRED.COM (Nov. 20, 2012), available at http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/11/software-patents-bioinformat 
ics/.  
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scrutiny should lead to an increase in rejection on obviousness grounds, thereby 
increasing the quality of patents granted overall.53 One of the arguments in support 
of this approach is that it could be implemented immediately under existing law.54 
Yet some counter-argue pessimistically that reforms made at an administrative level 
would ultimately be ineffective at improving patent quality.55 
More nuanced ideas propose greater leniency or allowances with regards to 
independent inventorship.56 One suggested approach would be to change the 
current rules and allow independent invention to be asserted as a defense to 
infringement.57 Another approach would be to judge obviousness by whether 
multiple inventors have identified the same results at approximately the same 
time.58 Lastly, another approach would be to comparatively weigh the costs of 
discovering a patentee’s invention against the costs of independently inventing that 
same invention.59 
C. Guidance and Precedent from the Federal Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court 
The above proposals represent only a small fraction of the various approaches that 
have been suggested, and have come about in part because of inadequate guidance 
from the courts. In particular, the Federal Circuit has faced substantial criticism for 
its unhelpful rulings and lack of clear guidance on resolving problematic aspects of 
software-related patents,60 and has even criticized itself for its own discordant 
results.61 The Federal Circuit arguably reached its lowest point when it sat en banc 
 
 53. Rai, supra note 52. 
 54. Id. See also Eric Goldman, How to Fix Software Patents (Part 3 of 3), FORBES (Dec. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/12/12/how-to-fix-software-patents/. 
 55. R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2163–65 (2009). 
 56. See infra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 57. See, e.g., Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 475 (2006).  
 58. See, e.g., John Duffy, Let’s Get Rid of Kludgy Patent Fixes and Define the Non-Obvious, WIRED.COM 
(Nov. 16, 2012), available at http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/11/lets-get-rid-of-kludgy-patent-fixes-and-d 
efine-the-non-obvious/. See also Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of 
Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1614 (2011).  
 59. See Goldman, supra note 54. See generally Samson Vermont, Basing Patent Remedies on Harm to the 
World Instead of Harm to the Patentee, (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Stanford Univ.), available at: 
http://www.stanford.edu/dept/law/ipsc/Paper%20PDF/Vermont,%20Samson%20-%20Paper.pdf. 
 60. See James Grimmelmann, If Our Patent Court Screws Up Slipper Patents, How Can It Rule Sensibly on 
Smartphones? WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/ 
201. 
3/09/24/if-our-top-patent-court-screws-up-slipper-patents-how-can-it-rule-sensibly-on-smartphones/. See also 
James P. Muraff & Kevin Cukierski, Predictability Still Needed From Divided Federal Circuit on Software Patents, 
NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/predictability-still-needed-divide 
d-federal-circuit-software-patents.  
 61. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2013)(“Our court is 
irreconcilably fractured over these system claims and there are many similar cases pending before our court and 
the district courts.”) (Moore, J., dissenting in part); see also id. at 1321 (“The court . . . hoped to ameliorate 
[many uncertainties] by providing objective standards for section 101 patent-eligibility. Instead we have 
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to hear the case of CLS Bank v. Alice Corp. and issued several opinions devoid of 
agreement other than to find the claims invalid.62 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions have been more informative than 
those of the Federal Circuit, its opinions have not fully resolved the ongoing issues 
with software-related patents. For instance, although the Court heard Bilski v. 
Kappos in 2010,63 enduring confusion led the Court to revisit many of the same 
issues in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank just three years later.64 Despite the lack of an 
apparently definitive opinion on software-related patents, several of the Supreme 
Court’s precedents are important to note for insight into what approaches the 
Court has taken in the past, and what guiding considerations it may rely on in the 
future. 
The Benson-Flook-Diehr trilogy of cases in particular reveals the evolution of the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of software-related patents and where the line should be 
drawn for eligibility.65 
In Gottschalk v. Benson the Court ruled that an invention which is nothing more 
than a broad mathematical idea cannot be patentable.66 Although the patent claims 
required a computer for implementation, the Court did not find this to be a 
meaningful limitation, since “[t]he mathematical formula involved here has no 
substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer, 
which . . . would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect 
would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”67 
Six years after Benson, the Court again asserted limitations for software patents 
when it ruled in Parker v. Flook that merely adding token “post-solution activity” 
was insufficient for circumventing the bar on claiming a mathematical formula.68 As 
reiterated by the Bilski Court: “Flook stands for the proposition that the prohibition 
against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the 
use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or adding 
‘insignificant postsolution activity.’”69 
 
propounded at least three incompatible standards, devoid of consensus, serving simply to add to the 
unreliability and cost of the system of patents as an incentive for innovation. With today’s judicial deadlock, the 
only assurance is that any successful innovation is likely to be challenged in opportunistic litigation, whose 
result will depend on the random selection of the panel.”) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 64. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 65. See, e.g., KLEMENS, supra note 6, at 53. 
 66. Gottschalk v. Benson, 93 S. Ct. 253, 257 (1972).  
 67. Id. at 257.  
 68. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585, 596 (1978). 
 69. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)). See also 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 599 (1978) (“The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional 
or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form over 
substance. A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-solution activity to almost any mathematical 
formula; the Pythagorean theorem would not have been patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent 
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Three years after Flook, the Supreme Court heard Diamond v. Diehr.70 The Court 
conceded that although “[the claimed] process admittedly employs a well-known 
mathematical equation,” in contrast with Benson and Flook, the claims did “not seek 
to preempt the use of that equation.”71 The Court noted that while “abstract ideas, 
laws of nature, or mathematical formula” may not be patented, “an application of a 
law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be 
deserving of patent protection.”72 
More than 30 years later, the Supreme Court relied on the foundations of the 
Benson-Flook-Diehr trilogy when it issued its decision in Bilski v. Kappos.73 The 
Court found that the patent claims could not receive protection since “[they] 
attempt to patent the use of the abstract idea of hedging risk in the energy market 
and then instruct the use of well-known random analysis techniques to help 
establish some of the inputs into the equation.”74 Ultimately, the Court asserted that 
“[r]ather than adopting categorical rules that might have wide-ranging and 
unforeseen impacts, the Court resolves this case narrowly on the basis of this 
Court’s decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.”75 However, Bilski was largely seen as 
establishing very “little by way of clear and cogent parameters for method-claim 
eligibility, creating a quagmire for patent examiners and patent practitioners in 
their roles as primary gatekeepers of the patent system.”76 
In 2013, the Federal Circuit heard the case of CLS Bank v. Alice Corp.,77 which 
some hoped would establish a more administrable framework for software-related 
 
application contained a final step indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to existing 
surveying techniques.”).  
 70. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 71. Id. at 187. 
 72. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 (emphasis original)). “We recognize, of course, 
that when a claim recites a mathematical formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry 
must be made into whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract. A 
mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be 
circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment. . . . 
Similarly, insignificant post-solution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable 
process. . . . To hold otherwise would allow a competent draftsman to evade the recognized limitations on the 
type of subject matter eligible for patent protection. On the other hand, when a claim containing a 
mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a 
whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing 
an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 
191–93. 
 73. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229. 
 74. Id. at 3231. 
 75. Id. at 3229. 
 76. See Abby Bhattacharayya, Implementation, or the Possible Lack Thereof, of the Bilski Supreme Court 
Decision, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 103, 103 (2011), available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol6/i 
ss1/5. See also infra notes 78 and 79, and accompanying text. 
 77. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 
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patents78 since the Bilski decision did not provide much resolution for 
practitioners.79 The case concerned patents owned by Alice Corporation involving 
the use of an escrow system to manage risk, and “relate[d] to a computerized 
trading platform used for conducting financial transactions in which a third party 
settles obligations between a first and a second party so as to eliminate 
‘counterparty’ or ‘settlement’ risk.”80 The en banc court could not reach a 
consensus,81 and among the opinions was the alarmist warning that “if all of these 
claims . . . are not patent-eligible, this case is the death of hundreds of thousands of 
patents, including all business method, financial system, and software patents as 
well as many computer implemented and telecommunications patents.”82 
Not surprisingly, the CLS v. Alice Corp. decision was appealed to the Supreme 
Court. In a unanimous decision striking down the patents, the Court reiterated that 
the Benson-Flook-Diehr trilogy demonstrates that “mere recitation of a generic 
computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible 
invention.”83 The Court asserted that it is irrelevant that a computer is a physical 
object, since “if that were the end of the § 101 inquiry, an applicant could claim any 
principle of the physical or social sciences by reciting a computer system configured 
to implement the relevant concept,” and as a result the determination of patent 
eligibility would “depend simply on the draftsman’s art.”84 Although practitioners 
have reacted with more optimism about this decision than others from the Supreme 
Court—and although this decision has already had more of an immediate effect—
there are still reservations that it may only be a matter of time before 
circumventions are discovered and exploited.85 
 
 
 78. See, e.g., Tony Dutra, CLS v. Alice en banc: Finally resolving post-Bilski mess?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 16, 
2012), http://www.bna.com/cls-alice-en-b17179870238/.  
 79. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Bilski Ruling: The Patent Wars Untouched, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (June 28, 2010, 
7:31 PM), http:// bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/bilski-ruling-the-patent-wars-untouched/.  
 80. CLS Bank Int’l., 717 F.3d at 1274. 
 81. Id. at 1282. A plurality of five judges argued that the relevant inquiry should involve identifying 
preemption concerns, and performing an analysis where “the balance of the claim [is] evaluated to determine 
whether it contains additional substantive limitations that narrow, confine, or otherwise tie down the claim so 
that, in practical terms, it does not cover the full abstract idea itself.” Id. Another plurality of four judges 
asserted that, “[t]he relevant inquiry must be whether a claim includes meaningful limitations restricting it to an 
application, rather than merely an abstract idea.” Id. at 1299 (emphasis in original). And in another plurality 
opinion, concern was expressed that with the current interpretation of § 101, application of the abstract idea 
exception had been given “staggering breadth to what is meant to be a narrow judicial exception.” Id. at 1313. 
 82. Id. at 1313. 
 83. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014). 
 84. Id. at 14. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 593 (1978)). 
 85. See, e.g., Simon Phipps, Alice is Killing The Trolls—But Expect Patent Lawyers to Strike Back, 
INFOWORLD (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.infoworld.com/article/2607187/patents/alice-is-killing-the-trolls-but-
expect-patent-lawyers-to-strike-back.html. 
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II. Professor Mark Lemley’s Proposal for Functional Claiming 
Limitations 
Professor Lemley86 has asserted that the answer to many software patentability 
issues is in stricter application of 35 U.S.C. § 112(f)87 which would impose 
restrictions on functional claiming.88 In advocating for this approach, Lemley argues 
that an obvious advantage is its ease of implementation, since it would require no 
rewriting of patent law—rather it would merely require “interpret[ing] the existing 
statute given the realities of software and modern patent practice.”89 The courts 
could easily adopt this approach, quickly ending the fractured debates, and 
resolving the present conflicts surrounding software-related patents.90 
A. History of Functional Claiming and its Present Use 
As detailed by Lemley, the use of functional claiming has varied throughout the 
years.91 In the early nineteenth century, “patent claims served as sign posts, not as 
fence posts,” yet toward the middle of the nineteenth century, claim boundaries 
were greatly expanded and “patentees were using claim language not to signpost 
what they had done, but to try to define a conceptual area around which they could 
place legal fence posts.”92 Courts eventually rejected such expansive claiming 
practices, and although Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker93 seemingly 
ended functional claiming as a whole, Congress effectively reinstated its use in 
Section 112(f) of the Patent Act of 1952—though in the more narrowed form of 
“means-plus-function” claiming.94 As noted by Lemley, means-plus-function claim 
language is currently viewed dismissively as “narrow and easy for potential 
infringers to evade,” so this aspect of the 1952 Act has largely fallen by the wayside.95 
 
 86. See supra note 8. 
 87. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2014). The passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in 2011 changed 35 
U.S.C. § 112 into (a)–(f) format. What was once Section 112 paragraph six is now 112(f). Id. (as amended Sept. 
16, 2011 , P.L. 112-29, § 4(c)). 
 88. Lemley, supra note 26. 
 89. Mark A. Lemley, Let’s Go Back to Patenting the ‘Solution,’ Not the ‘Problem’, WIRED (Oct. 31, 2012), 
www.wired.com/opinion/2012/10/mark-lemley-functional-claiming/. See also Lemley, supra note 26, at 947–48. 
 90. Lemley, supra note 26, at 947–48 (“The Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court could, with one fell 
swoop, do away with most of the problem of over-claiming in software patents—and with it, most of the 
problems with software patents.”). 
 91. Id. at 910–19. Infringement inquiries during this time were almost always subject to what is known 
now as the doctrine of equivalents, and judgments made by courts were done on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 910–
11. 
 92. Id. at 910–11. 
 93. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946). 
 94. Lemley, supra note 26, at 914–16. 
 95. Id. at 918–19. 
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Consequently, the practice of pressing boundaries and claiming the outermost 
periphery of an invention has continued without slowing down.96 
Since inventors continue to seek and secure broad patent claims,97 the 
construction of many claims “are effectively unlimited as a matter of structure. The 
function they perform may be simple or complex, broad or narrow, but in the 
modern world” many patent claims are written to “effectively cover any device that 
performs that function in any way.”98 These claims go even farther and “assert 
ownership of any device that is capable of implementing that idea, whether or not 
the device actually does so.”99 Consequently, software-related patents have 
essentially reverted to the form that existed before the 1952 Patent Act, without 
being held to the constraints of Section 112(f).100 
B. Lemley’s Proposal for Eliminating Overbroad Software Patents 
Lemley’s suggestion for resolving the current state of software patents is very 
straightforward: “[T]ake seriously the dictate of Section 112(f). . . . [T]ake seriously 
law that is on the books but doesn’t seem to get applied in practice.”101 The language 
of 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) states: 
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or 
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, 
material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to 
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the 
specification and equivalents thereof.102 
In short, claims that use this type of “means” clause define elements by their 
function rather than their structure—that is, defining elements by what they do 
rather than what they are.103 
Lemley points out that the Federal Circuit has been formalistic in its application 
of Section 112(f),104 and it continues to use the presence or absence of the word 
“means” from a claim to determine which party has the burden of proving that the 
an element falls under the purview of Section 112(f).105 However, despite a strict 
approach for requiring actual algorithms and programing in claims, the realities of 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 919. 
 98. Id. at 920–23 (emphasis original). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Lemley, supra note 26, at 924, 926. 
 101. Id. at 947. 
 102. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2014). 
 103. FABER, supra note 3. 
 104. Lemley, supra note 26, at, 944–45 n.168. 
 105. FABER, supra note 3, at 3-119. 
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computer technology have largely been ignored.106 Where references are made to 
general purpose computers “programmed to” achieve some function, case law 
treats those computers as structure and not as a means-plus-function claim with 
proper limitations.107 “The ‘structure, material or acts’ that must support a claim in 
functional language must be more than mere window-dressing. The intent of 
[Section 112(f)] was to allow functional claiming only when it was limited to 
particular implementations of that function, not when it encompassed all feasible 
ways of achieving the goal.”108 
According to Lemley, it should not make a difference whether a claim is 
explicitly written in the form “means for doing x,” but what matters is whether the 
claim is “expressed as a ‘means or step for performing a specified function without 
the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof.’”109 Abiding by this 
framework, if a term does not have a generally understood meaning then it should 
be construed under 112(f) if used in a means–type claim.110 Examples of such terms 
include “a device for . . .” or “an element for . . .” or “a mechanism for . . .” and 
would all be subjected to the more stringent application of Section 112(f).111 If these 
claims do not have accompanying structure to sufficiently limit their scope, then 
those claims should fail on grounds such as indefiniteness, or lack of enablement. 
Despite potential obstacles112 Lemley asserts that faithful application of Section 
112(f) may be necessary in order to save many software patents and avoid the 
tumultuous effects of sweeping invalidation.113 As Lemley concludes: 
It is time to end functional claiming (again). Allowing inventors to assert 
ownership over the problem they solved, rather than merely the way they 
solved it, is inconsistent with history, with the patent statute, and with good 
patent policy. It is responsible in large part for the untenable situation 
software patents have left us in. And while software patent owners may 
object that they need functional claiming to get effective protection, that 
objection is unpersuasive, both because of the harm functional claiming 
causes and because functional patent claims are likely invalid under current 
law. 
 
 106. Id. at 945–46. 
 107. Id. at 946. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 944 (emphasis added). See also FABER, supra note 3, at 3-129 (stating that the word “for” in a 
means-plus-function claim may not need to be used either, and that the claim only be written in means-type 
form). 
 110. FABER, supra note 3, at 3-129. 
 111. Id. at 3-126. 
 112. Lemley’s thesis does address some of the concerns that others may raise with his proposal. The two 
major objections addressed are: whether such changes will actually accomplish the desired results, and whether 
inventors will be unfairly disadvantaged. See Lemley, supra note 26, at 949–61 (2013).  
 113. Id. at 962–63. 
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A patent should not guarantee insulation from competition. To the 
contrary, properly understood, patents spur competition by preventing 
direct imitation while leaving open avenues for alternative development. 
We have forgotten that lesson in software, to our great cost. Returning to a 
world in which inventors own their idea, but not the ideas of others, will go 
a long way towards ensuring that patents encourage rather than retard 
software innovation.114 
III. The Practical Effects of Stricter Functional Claiming 
Limitations 
It is unknown what the actual effects may be from adopting Lemley’s proposal until 
the approach is implemented and tested before judges who understand its proper 
administration.115 Yet it is possible to gain some insight into what the consequences 
may be for software-related patents by applying Lemley’s approach to previously 
litigated matters and carefully observing what differences or effects may result. To 
accomplish this, several representative patents have been collected and the claims 
strictly construed under Section 112(f). The analyses demonstrate what types of 
claims would or would not survive, and what the practical effects may be from 
adhering to stricter 112(f) application. 
A.  Claims That Would Not Survive Stricter Applications of Section 112(f) 
Greater use of Section 112(f), as advocated by Lemley, would be intended to 
produce better quality patents.116 Accordingly, it should be expected that many 
patents would therefore be invalidated since they would not be of sufficient quality 
to satisfy the higher standards. An example of claims which would not survive this 
type of scrutiny comes from U.S. Patent 5,970,479 (the ‘479 patent) at issue in Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank.117 Before the court were claims 33 and 34, which read: 
33. A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party 
holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, the 
credit records and debit records for exchange of predetermined obligations, 
the method comprising the steps of: 
(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each 
stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution from 
the exchange institutions; 
 
 114. Id. at 964. 
 115. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 116. See supra Part II.B. 
 117. 134 S. Ct. 734 (U.S. 2013). 
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(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for each 
shadow credit record and shadow debit record; 
(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the supervisory 
institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit record or shadow 
debit record, allowing only these transactions that do not result in the value 
of the shadow debit record being less than the value of the shadow credit 
record at any time, each said adjustment taking place in chronological 
order; and 
(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing ones of the 
exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit record and 
debit record of the respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of 
the said permitted transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable, 
time invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions. 
34. The method as in claim 33, wherein the end-of-day instructions 
represent credits and debits netted throughout the day for each party in 
respect of all the transactions of that day.118 
The ‘479 patent would be construed under 112(f) because use of the language “a 
method for . . .” in this context is a means clause. In order to survive, the claim 
requires limiting structure, yet there is none present. Terms with generally 
understood meanings such as “credit record” and “debit record” simply describe 
features which do not perform a tangible function. Failure to show structure that 
performs the function means the claims are invalid,119 which would effectively limit 
the scope of the ‘479 patent. If allowed to survive, these claims would extend to 
anything that performs the function—not just computers—and could be asserted 
in absurd situations against devices such as an abacus, graphing calculators, or even 
handwritten record books. 
The ‘479 patent is an example of how stricter application of Section 112(f) could 
be beneficial. An obviously bad patent—which was nevertheless granted by the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office—would not survive the application of greater 
functional claiming limitations. Instead of creating a monopoly over the 
foundational principles of escrow, the claimant would be forced to establish that the 
patent had something with a more “inventive” quality to it.120 Under this type of 
analysis, it would be easier to discern the presence or absence of that elusive 
 
 118. U.S. Patent No. 5,790,479 col. 65, l.23–53 (filed Aug, 4, 1998). 
 119. See, e.g., In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also Crouch, supra note 3.  
 120. See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273-92 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (noting that 
patentability requires an “inventive concept” that provides “something more” to a viable claim) (per curiam) 
(Lourie, J., concurring). 
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characteristic “something more”—which the courts have inadequately articulated—
and could resolve many of the difficulties in trying to express what makes a patent 
worthy of protection. 
Another example of claims which would not survive can be seen in the case of 
Parker v. Flook.121 The patent application concerned a “Method for Updating Alarm 
Limits” and contained the following claim: 
1. A method for updating the value of at least one alarm limit on at least 
one process variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical 
conversion of hydrocarbons wherein said alarm limit has a current value of 
Bo + K 
wherein Bo is the current alarm base and K is a predetermined alarm offset 
which comprises: 
(1) Determining the present value of said process variable, said present 
value being defined as PVL: 
(2) determining a new alarm base B1, using the following equation: 
B1 = Bo (1.0 - F) + PVL (F) 
where F is a predetermined number greater than zero and less than 1.0; 
(3) determining an updated alarm limit value which is defined as 
B1 + K; and, thereafter 
(4) adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit value.122 
Although the Supreme Court decided that the claims in Flook were directed to 
unpatentable subject matter,123 they would also fail under 112(f) considerations 
because they are not tied to any structure, and claim unlimited use of a particular 
function. Reading the various elements, there is nothing present which 
demonstrates structure that performs the function—only a description of the 
function itself. 
 
 121. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 122. Application of Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
 123. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594. 
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Further examples of patents which would not pass strict 112(f) application 
include the various claims at issue in Bancorp Services, LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. 
of Canada.,124 CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,125 Dealertrack, Inc. v. 
Huber,126 Netgear, Inc. v. Ruckus Wireless, Inc.,127 Noah Systems, Inc. v. Intuit, Inc.,128 
 
 124. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (claims 
of U.S. Patents 5,926,792 and 7,249,037). See, e.g., claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,926, 792, which reads: 
A computer system for managing a life insurance policy on behalf of a policy holder, the 
computer system comprising: 
generating means for generating a life insurance policy including a stable value protected 
investment with an initial value based on a value of underlying securities; 
fee calculating means for calculating fee units for members of a management group which 
manage the life insurance policy; 
credit calculating means for calculating surrender value protected investment credits for the life 
insurance policy; 
investment determining means for determining an investment value and a value of the 
underlying securities for the current day; 
policy calculating means for calculating a policy value and a policy unit value for the current day; 
storing means for storing the policy unit value for the current day; and 
one of: 
removing means for removing the fees units for members of the management group which 
manages the life insurance policy, and 
accumulating means for accumulating fee units on behalf of the management group. 
 125. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (claims 2 and 3 of U.S. 
Patent No. 6,029,154 (filed Jul. 28, 1997)). 
 126. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (claims 7–9, 12, 14, 16, and 17 of U.S. Patent 
No. 6,587,841 and claims 1, 3, and 4 of U.S. Patent No. 7,181,427). See, e.g., claims 1 and 2 of U.S. Patent No. 
6,587,841 (filed Jun. 30, 1998), which read: 
1. A credit application and routing system including a central processor having and executing a 
program and further comprising: 
data input means for selectively receiving credit application data from respective applicants at 
remote locations; and 
routing means for selectively forwarding the credit application data to remote funding sources  
and forwarding funding decision data from the funding sources to the respective applicants, 
wherein the routing means comprises means for sending at least a portion of a credit application 
to more than one of said remote funding sources sequentially until a funding source returns a 
positive funding decision or until all funding sources have been exhausted. 
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State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,129 and Ultramercial, 
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC.130 
Not only would strict Section 112(f) application provide a finer screen for patent 
quality, but the Flook patent and others reveal the potential for additional benefits 
from this approach. Notably, use of Section 112(f) would provide courts with 
greater flexibility in decision making rather than relying so much on the coarse 
filter of Section 101.131 This would add an arrow to the judicial quiver—one 
founded in purely statutory considerations—and avoid the need for courts to try 
and formulate an effective rule. Lemley’s approach fits this tactic of applying law 
that is already on the books rather than making unnecessary categorical changes.132 
As a result, stricter application of Section 112(f) could make the role of the courts 
 
2. The credit application and routing system according to claim 1, wherein said central processor 
further provides at least one of a loan calculator, lender product news and funding source 
articles. 
  127.    Netgear, Inc. v. Ruckus Wireless, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 470, 471–72 (D. Del. 2012) (claims of U.S. Patent 
Nos. 5,812,531; 6,621,454; 7,263,143; and 5,507,035). 
  128.    Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (claims 12–17, 29–38, and 40–56 of U.S. 
Patent No. 5,875,435).  
  129.    State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (claims of U.S. 
Patent No. 5,193,056). See, e.g., claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 which reads: 
1. A data processing system for managing a financial services configuration of a portfolio 
established as a partnership, each partner being one of a plurality of funds, comprising: 
(a) computer processor means for processing data; 
(b) storage means for storing data on a storage medium; 
(c) first means for initializing the storage medium; 
(d) second means for processing data regarding assets in the portfolio and each of the funds from 
a previous day and data regarding increases or decreases in each of the funds, assets and for 
allocating the percentage share that each fund holds in the portfolio; 
(e) third means for processing data regarding daily incremental income, expenses, and net 
realized gain or loss for the portfolio and for allocating such data among each fund; 
(f) fourth means for processing data regarding daily net unrealized gain or loss for the portfolio 
and for allocating such data among each fund; and 
(g) fifth means for processing data regarding aggregate year-end income, expenses, and capital 
gain or loss for the portfolio and each of the funds. 
  130.    Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545). 
  131.    35 U.S.C. § 101 (2014). (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). Id. 
  132.    See supra note 101. 
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easier by providing more distinct guidelines to consider when making decisions on 
complicated and highly technical patents. 
B. Claims That Would Survive Stricter Applications of Section 112(f) 
Although low-quality patents would easily be screened out under Lemley’s 
proposal, the standard cannot also be so stringent that it causes high-quality patents 
to be rejected as well. If patents that are deserving of protection cannot survive, then 
the patent system will fail to provide the incentives that form part of its 
foundation.133 Fortunately, Lemley’s approach does not appear to set the bar too 
high.134 An example of a patent which would pass strict Section 112(f) application is 
seen in RLIS v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions.135 At issue were claims 2, 4, and 5 of 
U.S. Patent 5,823,948 (the ‘948 patent), which read: 
2. A method of patient record documentation, tracking and order entry, 
comprising providing software in file servers, providing software from the 
file servers through a network hub and network to multiple peripheral 
CPUs, inputting data on data entry screens on monitors connected to the 
CPUs, the inputting comprising entering patient data in the multiple CPUs 
by touch screens, mouses and keyboards in response to the data entry screens 
on monitors connected to the CPUs, transferring the patient data from the 
CPUs to the file servers, making a record for individual patients, dictating 
portions of the record that are unique to particular patients, transmitting 
the dictation over lines to a transcription center, transcribing the dictation 
and transmitting the dictation transcriptions to at least one communication 
server, feeding the dictation transcriptions to the file servers as text, storing 
the text with the patient data on particular patients in the file servers, 
storing word and sentence generation and coordination software in the 
peripheral CPUs, generating text sentences in medical English text from 
patient data, displaying on the monitors connected to the peripheral CPUs 
the text sentences in medical English text combined with the text from the 
dictation transcriptions assembled as text summaries, and providing the 
text summaries from the peripheral CPUs to printers via the network for 
generation of printed patient textual reports. 
4. The method of claim 2, further comprising producing nurses’ notes data 
by entering the patient data with touch screens, mouses and keyboards, 
transferring the nurses’ notes data from the peripheral CPUs to the file 
 
  133.    See, e.g., supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
  134.    Supra Part II.B. 
  135.    RLIS, Inc. v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc., 3:12-CV-208, 2013 WL 3772472 (S.D. Tex. July 16, 
2013) (U.S. Patent Nos. 7,076,436, and 5,823,948). 
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servers, storing the nurses’ notes data in the file servers, transmitting the 
nurses’ notes data to the peripheral CPUs, recompiling the nurses’ notes 
data into nurses’ notes text in the CPUs, displaying the nurses’ notes text on 
peripheral CPU monitor screens, and printing the nurses’ notes text on the 
printer. 
5. The method of claim 2, further comprising storing prephrased text 
examples in the peripheral CPUs, and preliminarily inputting prephrased 
personalized text by individual physicians and nurses, and compiling the 
personalized text with the patient data for producing medical English text 
summaries and reports.136 
In this patent, the language “a method for . . .” indicates a means clause which 
would bring these claims under 112(f). Although the method described is seemingly 
vague, the language in the ‘948 patent is tied to several elements of structure—
unlike the language in either Alice v. CLS or Parker v. Flook.137 For instance, the 
initial method claim in the ‘948 patent is supported by “file servers” and “peripheral 
CPUs” as structure. Or looking at language such as “inputting data on data entry 
screens on monitors connected to the CPUs, the inputting comprising entering 
patient data in the multiple CPUs by touch screens, mouses and keyboards,” the 
description of “inputting data” would be a function, yet it is grounded in 
supporting elements of “CPUs” and “touch screens, mouses and keyboards.”138 
Another example is “transferring the patient data from the CPUs to the file servers,” 
where transferring patient data is a function but it is also supported by the physical 
file servers and CPUs.139 There are many other instances of functions in the ‘948 
patent, including transcribing and transmitting dictation, generating and displaying 
text summaries, and producing and transmitting notes data. Yet all of these 
functions are tied to structural elements including CPUs, communication servers, 
file servers, monitors, printers, touch screens, and peripheral CPUs. This patent is 
an excellent example of how Lemley’s proposal would be an easily administrable 
method for distinguishing the quality of claims. 
Another example of a patent which would survive stricter application of 112(f) 
can be found in the case of Ibormeith v. Mercedes-Benz.140 At issue was U.S. Patent 
6,313,749 (the’749 patent), which read in part: 
1. A sleepiness monitor for a vehicle driver, or machine operator, 
comprising: 
 
  136.    U.S. Patent No. 5,823,948 (filed July 8, 1996). 
  137.    See supra Part III.A. 
  138.    U.S. Patent No. 5,823,948 (filed July 8, 1996). 
  139.    Id. 
  140.    Ibormeith IP, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 732 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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a sensor for sensing a driver or operator control input; 
a memory for storing an operational model that includes a physiological 
reference model of driver or operator circadian rhythm pattern(s) and a 
vehicle or machine operating model or algorithm; 
computational means for weighting the operational model according to time 
of day in relation to the driver or operator circadian rhythm pattern(s) and 
for deriving, from the weighted model, driver or operator sleepiness 
condition and producing an output determined thereby; and 
a warning indicator triggered by the computational means output, to 
provide a warning indicator of driver or operator sleepiness. 
2. The sleepiness monitor as claimed in claim 1, including a driver personal 
data entry interface, for entry of driver sleep pattern, age, sex, and recent 
alcohol consumption. 
3. The sleepiness monitor as claimed in claim 1, including provision, by way 
of switches, for input of responses to predetermined questions upon driver or 
operator condition, including recent sleep history. 
4. The sleepiness monitor as claimed in claim 1, wherein the sensor 
comprises a magnetic flux coupled, inductive sensor for rate of change of 
vehicle or machine steerage. 
5. The sleepiness monitor as claimed in claim 1, including a further sensor 
for vehicle acceleration and/or speed. 
6. The sleepiness monitor as claimed in claim 1, including a further sensor 
for vehicle cab temperature. 
7. The sleepiness monitor as claimed in claim 1, including a further sensor 
for ambient light. 
8. A vehicle or machine incorporating a sleepiness monitor as claimed in 
claim 1.141 
Although the patent appears to claim only a physical device for monitoring 
sleepiness, it also reads as claiming the function of monitoring sleepiness. In 
 
  141.    U.S. Patent No. 6,313,749 col. 16 (filed Jan. 5, 1998). 
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particular, claim 1 includes the language “computational means for . . .” which is 
used in the style of a means-type limitation that would require the claims to be 
construed under 112(f).142 The “computational means” language is troublesome for 
claim 1 since there is no apparent generally understood meaning for the term. 
Moreover, claim 1 does not describe sufficient structure since terms such as “a 
sensor for sensing” or “a memory for storing” or “a warning indicator” are all too 
general to offer adequate limitation.143 However, dependent claims 2 through 8 
provide the structural limitations which would allow claim 1 to survive.144 For 
instance, claim 4 describes the sensor in greater detail, adding that it is “a magnetic 
flux coupled, inductive sensor.”145 Although the other claims do not provide 
particularly concrete language for limiting the scope of the claims, the Ex Parte 
Reexamination Certificate issued for this patent provides a stronger basis for its 
survival under Section 112(f). Specifically, claims 10 and 11 of the Certificate 
eliminate the term “computational means for” and use more detailed language, 
such as “an internal microprocessor specially programmed to . . . .” This language 
and other descriptions in claims 10 and 11 appear to provide the adequate 
limitations that should be present in high quality patents. 146 
Looking at examples such as the ‘948 and the ‘749 patents demonstrates that 
Lemley’s proposed approach to software-related patents is a reasonable one. Rather 
 
  142.    Id. 
  143.    Id. 
  144.    Claim 9 of the ‘749 patent would likely be invalidated under this type of analysis because it does not 
have similar language to claim 1 that would effectively limit the “computational means for” term. See U.S. 
Patent No. 6,313,749, col. 16 (filed Jan. 5, 1998). 
  145.    Id. 
  146.    See, e.g., claim 10 of the ‘749 patent which reads: 
10. A sleepiness monitor for a vehicle driver, or machine operator, comprising: 
a sensor for sensing a driver or operator control input, wherein said sensor is for sensing steering 
transitions about a reference position; 
a memory for storing an operational model that includes a pre-loaded physiological reference 
model of a driver or operator circadian rhythm pattern(s) and a vehicle or machine operating 
model or algorithm; 
an internal microprocessor specially programmed to incorporate said sensed steering transitions 
into said vehicle or machine operating model or algorithm and to weight said operational model 
according to time of day in relation to the driver or operator circadian rhythm pattern(s), derive, 
from the weighted model, a driver or operator sleepiness condition and produce an output 
determined thereby; and 
a warning indicator, triggered by the processor output, to provide a warning indication of driver 
or operator sleepiness, wherein said warning indicator includes a visual warning shown on or 
through a display screen. 
Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate, U.S. Patent No. 6,313,749. 
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than create an insurmountable hurdle, claims are merely subject to a higher 
standard—one that has a statutory basis—which imposes more realistic limitations 
and encourages better quality of claims.147 
IV. Conclusion 
Adopting stricter application of Section 112(f) would be an effective and consistent 
approach to resolving many of the problematic issues with software-related patents. 
Such a standard would make it easier for entities to navigate the enormous size and 
complexity of the present system, or provide tools to hack through dense patent 
thickets and create more equitable bargaining positions with other companies and 
NPEs.148 It should put an end to the fractured debates on how to “solve” problems 
with software-related patents,149 and relieve the courts from formulating inadequate 
judicial frameworks.150 Applying strict 112(f) limitations would also ensure that the 
bar for protection is not set so high that it would obstruct innovative ideas from 
receiving due protection.151 This approach is not a short cut which would make for 
long delays, nor should there be dire concern about “the death of hundreds of 
 
  147.    An example of how Section 112(f) could encourage better quality claiming can be seen in the patents at 
issue in Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Looking at the six 
patents in question, the language used would not pass the strict application of 112(f) that Lemley advocates for. 
However, like the Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate in Ibormeith, supra note 146, small changes to the 
language would allow these patents to pass a more stringent standard. For example, claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 
5,477,305 reads: 
1. Apparatus for performing the halftoning of a gray scale image by utilizing a pixel-by-pixel 
comparison of said image against a blue noise mask array, comprising: 
a) a first memory for storing said blue noise mask array; 
b) a scanner for scanning said gray scale image to be halftoned to create a gray scale image array 
on a pixel-by-pixel basis; 
c) a second memory for storing said gray scale image array; 
d) a comparator for comparing, on a pixel-by-pixel basis, the value of each corresponding pixel 
in said blue noise mask array and said gray scale image array to produce a binary image array; 
and 
e) a converter for converting said binary image array to the desired halftoned image. 
 
Language such as “a first memory” or “a scanner” or “a second memory” or “a comparator” or “a converter” do 
not sufficiently describe limiting structure. Yet with simple changes—such as making use of more generally 
understood terms and more specific language—these claims would most likely survive the application of higher 
standards. 
  148.    See supra Part I.A. 
  149.    See supra Part I.B. 
  150.    See supra Part I.C. 
  151.    See supra Part II.B, III.  
  Application of Functional Claiming Limitations 
180 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
thousands of patents,”152 even though numerous claims would not survive. The 
examples in Part III demonstrate exactly the kind of low-quality patents which 
should have been screened out by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in the first 
place,153 while also demonstrating how small changes can increase the overall quality 
of patent claims.154 Given the increasing volume and rate of software-related patents 
involved in litigation,155 higher standards must be implemented to lessen the 
daunting situation that innovators presently face.156 Raising and enforcing higher 
standards should not only increase patent quality, but also facilitate greater 
innovation such that the world may grow more enlightened and ensure that 
knowledge may be more equally diffused. 
 
 
  152.    CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 
  153.    See supra Part III.A. 
  154.    See supra Part III.B. 
  155.    See supra notes 3– 4, and accompanying text. 
  156.    See supra notes 20 and 31. 
